## **EXHIBIT 10**

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SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                         CHANCERY DIV: GENERAL EQ. PART
                         ESSEX COUNTY
                         DOCKET NO.: C-25-21
                         A.D. #
GURBIR S. GREWAL, the New)
Jersey Attorney General, )
KAITLIN CARUSO, acting )
director of New Jersey )
Division of Consumer )
Affairs. )
                                 TRANSCRIPT
                                      OF
                         ) ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE
        Plaintiff,
        VS.
SMITH & WESSON SALES
COMPANY, INC.,
        Defendant.
                    Place: Essex County
                           Wilentz Justice Complex
                           (Heard via Zoom)
                     Date: May 27, 2021
BEFORE:
     HONORABLE JODI LEE ALPER, P.J.Ch.
TRANSCRIPT ORDERED BY:
     AMANDA LAUFER CAMELOTTO, ESQ.,
     (DLA Piper, LLP)
APPEARANCES:
     MAYUR SAXENA, ESQ.
     (Assistant Attorney General)
     Attorney for Plaintiffs
     COURTNEY SALESKI, ESQ.
     (DLA Piper, LLP)
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Audio Recorded Recording Opr: Angela Hart I N D E X

## ARGUMENTS:

BY: Mr. Saxena.....4, 32

THE COURT:

Decision.....to be rendered

(Hearing commenced at 10:11 a.m.)

THE COURT: Good morning. This is the matter of Gurbir Grewal, the Attorney General of the State of New Jersey, and Kaitlin Caruso, acting director of the New Jersey Division of Consumer Affairs versus Smith & Wesson. The matter is filed under docket number C-25-21. I'm Judge Jodi Lee Alper. I sit in the Essex County Chancery Division. Today is May 27th, 2021. And it is 10:12 a.m. May I please have appearances of counsel starting with plaintiff's counsel. Please spell your last names.

MR. SAXENA: Good morning, Your Honor.

Assistant Attorney General Mayur Saxena, that's S like Sam, A-X like x-ray E-N like Nancy A, for plaintiffs and movants.

THE COURT: Thank you. Good morning Mr. Saxena. And now may I please have appearance of counsel for the defendant.

MS. SALESKI: Good morning, Your Honor. This is Courtney Saleski, S-A-L-E-S-K-I on behalf of Smith & Wesson. I believe some of my colleagues are on as well also on behalf of Smith & Wesson. I will ask if they will identify themselves as well if they can Your Honor.

THE COURT: Well they can, they don't have

to. You'll be the only one arguing. But certainly if you wish to have their appearances noted, we can do that.

MS. SALESKI: That's not necessary then, Your Honor. It will only be me arguing, thank you.

THE COURT: Very good, thank you then. And welcome everybody. The matter comes before the Court on an Order to Show Cause which was filed on behalf of the Attorney General essentially to enforce a subpoena which was filed pursuant to the New Jersey Division of Consumer Affairs, the Consumer Fraud Act, and a cross motion to dismiss or quash, or stay the subpoena.

I will hear first from the Attorney General please on your enforcement action and then I will hear from the defendant on your cross claim or counterclaim and then I will give Mr. Saxena another opportunity to speak.

MR. SAXENA: Thank you, Your Honor. May it please the Court, I'll start with a brief introduction before turning to the three points I would like to address today. The key facts in this subpoena enforcement proceeding are undisputed. The New Jersey Division of Consumer Affairs and the Attorney General served a subpoena on Smith & Wesson in October 2020. The State served that subpoena pursuant to it's broad

authority to investigate whether Smith & Wesson is engaging in deceptive advertising in violation of the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act.

The subpoena seeks production of documents and has standard document requests that are routinely used in the State's deceptive advertising investigations. For example, the first document request seeks copies of Smith & Wesson's advertisements. And subsequent requests seek documents in Smith & Wesson's possession that substantiate or disprove factual claims made in those advertisements.

Smith & Wesson has failed to obey the subpoena, has not produced any documents to date, and has made no effort to meet and confer with the State to discuss it's objections. Instead, the very next day after sending the State a letter objecting to the subpoena Smith & Wesson challenged the subpoena in federal court.

Based on these facts which cannot be meaningful disputed, the State seeks and order directing Smith & Wesson to comply with the subpoena.

I would like to express three points to explain why the subpoena should be enforced, and why Smith & Wesson Constitutional objections lack merit. First, the plain language of the subpoena shows that

the State seeks documents directly relevant to it's deceptive advertising investigation under the CFA. And this fact alone defeats Smith & Wesson's main objections under the First and Fourth Amendments.

Second, nearly all of Smith & Wesson's

Constitutional objections are premature and cannot be
adjudicated at this early subpoena enforcement stage.

And Smith & Wesson's narrow fall-back objection that
the mere production of documents will itself violate
constitutional privacy rights has no application here.

And third, there is no reason to stay these proceedings, Your Honor, in this Court which is the natural forum for subpoena enforcement as expressly designated by the Consumer Fraud Act. And especially not for Smith & Wesson's preemptive strike suit in federal court.

what exactly the State's subpoena seeks to investigate. Smith & Wesson argues that the subpoena is improperly aimed at investigating it's "advocacy of opinions that firearms are a useful or a good choice for self-defense." But that is just not the subpoena the State served. Simply reading the subpoena document requests reveals that the State is not concerned with Smith & Wesson's advocacy or it's opinions. But rather, with

whether the company's factual claims in its advertising are misleading. The actual subpoena served by the State is much more limited than the strawman Smith & Wesson attacks as an unconstitutional overreach.

More specifically, the State's subpoena is directly targeted to investigate two potential CFA violations. The first is that Smith & Wesson's advertising may violate the CFA and it's regulations by marketing firearms to consumers for the purpose of concealed carry without making disclosures required by regulations. Namely, a cleaner and conspicuous disclosure that concealed carry of a firearm is unlawful without a permit in New Jersey.

The key requests seeking documents relevant to that potential violation are requests one and two which seek copies of the advertisements and request 4A and B, which seek documents concerning specific types of claims that might be made in advertisements marketing firearms for concealed carry.

The second potential violation being investigated is that the company's advertisement may mislead consumers regarding the safety, effectiveness, or benefits of owning a Smith & Wesson firearm. The key requests here are once again requests one and two, which enable us to review the advertisements and assess

the factual claims made therein. And requests three, four, and six, which seek studies, risk assessments and other documents in Smith & Wesson's possession that support or disprove the factual claims made in the advertisements. These include claims about safety, effectiveness, or benefits of Smith & Wesson firearms for self-defense, home-defense, or even just when compared to other firearms.

In short, the subpoena investigates deceptive advertising by requesting copies of advertising, and then by requesting documents in Smith & Wesson's possession that may evidence deception. This is a tried and true model that the Division has routinely used to investigate deceptive advertising in many different contexts, including advertising of airbags, opioids, medical devices and also firearms, all of which are equally subject to the Consumer Fraud Act.

Just this week Judge Paganelli granted summary judgment to the State in a litigation springing from similar subpoena holding that certain advertisements for large-capacity ammunition magazines violated the CFA and its regulations. That's Grewal v. 22 Mods for All Incorporated, Your Honor.

The fact that the State's subpoena does in fact seek to investigate deceptive advertising is fatal

to Smith & Wesson's main Constitutional defenses.

Smith & Wesson's entire argument hinges on establishing that the subpoena does not seek to investigate deceptive advertising, and instead was issued solely for the improper purpose of punishing the company.

For example, Smith & Wesson argues that the State is engaging in viewpoint discrimination, but the First Amendment doesn't prohibit a subpoena directed at deceptive advertising which is not a protected viewpoint. Investigating fraud is not viewpoint discrimination against fraudsters.

Smith & Wesson also argues that the State's investigation is an unlawful search and seizure, but the Fourth Amendment permits an administrative subpoena on mere suspicion that the law has been violated. And it requires only that the subpoena document request be reasonably directed at a legitimate purpose and that standard is easily met.

Smith & Wesson bases several additional constitutional objections on it's argument that the State issued the subpoena and now seeks to enforce it based on an improper and retaliatory motive. But of course there's zero plausible allegations of this as detailed at pages 24 and 25 of our opposition brief, and certainly no allegations that would overcome the

strong presumption of regularity that a prosecutor has legitimate grounds for the action that he takes.

But importantly, even assuming that Smith & Wesson's assertions are true, they still fail to meet the extremely high standard here, which requires showing that the investigation has objectively no independent law enforcement justification and was brought even though the Attorney General knew this and knew there was no violation of law.

The standard is high because as the Supreme Court said in <u>Hartman v. Moore</u>, "a party can inflict a public officer with disruption and expense by alleging nothing ore in practical terms, than actually with a retaliatory animus, a subjective condition too easy to claim and too hard to defend against." That's what Smith & Wesson has tried unsuccessfully to do here, Your Honor.

Moving to my second point, Smith & Wesson's remaining Constitutional defenses are premature and cannot be adjudicated at this early stage. Smith & Wesson argues that courts routinely adjudicate

Constitutional objections before requiring the production of documents, but that's not correct. They actually had it backwards. Adjudicating Constitutional issues before requiring compliance with the subpoena is

a narrow exception and not the rule.

enforcement stage, all Smith & Wesson needs to do right now is produce responsive documents. After the Division receives that documents it may file an action to the CFA or it may conclude that no violation has occurred. So any Constitutional defense that is premised on the State actually applying the CFA to Smith & Wesson is necessarily premature and cannot be adjudicated until a specific claim is actually brought. Nearly all of Smith & Wesson's challenges are as applied Constitutional challenges, but no law has actually been applied to any advertisement yet.

For example, Smith & Wesson argues that the subpoena seeks to investigate only non-actionable opinion or puffery, but that argument is entirely hypothetical at this point, because we don't yet know what advertisements will be at issue, let alone which specific statements might violate the CFA. There is no basis at this stage to conclude that Smith & Wesson's advertising contains no factual claims or only opinion or puffery. And we certainly can't be expected to take their word for it. This is especially the case when the City of Gary, Indiana asserted that deceptive advertisement claim against Smith & Wesson based on

factual representations about produce safety and claim survived a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.

As to the Fourth Amendment, similarly Smith & Wesson insists that the State not only show that the subpoena is reasonably related to a legitimate purpose which we've done, but also must proffer exactly what "specific affirmative statements will support the State's hypothetical CFA claims in the future." And we have to do this without the benefit of any discovery. So initially the CFA doesn't even require affirmative statements to prove a violation, because it embraces knowing omissions and unconscionable commercial practices.

But in any case what Smith & Wesson demands is futile, because the State can't intelligently assess without the benefit of document production what our claims will ultimately be, or whether we're even going to bring claims at all.

You know, finally Smith & Wesson argues that the disclosure requirements of the regulations underlying the CFA unlawfully compel speech when they're applied to firearms advertisements. Again, this is premature, Your Honor. Smith & Wesson first has to produce the advertisements, and then only if the

regulations are applied can it challenge the application. But in any case, even on the merits, the government compels speech all the time, like the Surgeon General's warning on cigarettes or disclaimers that terms or conditions may apply in certain states.

So the authorities that Smith & Wesson relies on actually recognize these well-established exceptions for uncontroversial informational disclosures to consumers about the products that they're buying, like the disclosures that are required under the regulations, consumers like to know that the product they are buying is unlawful to possess absent certain circumstances.

So given that most of their arguments are premature at this stage, in it's reply brief Smith & Wesson has turned to a fallback argument, which asserts that the mere production of documents itself will infringe on the Company's First Amendment Rights. And they rely heavily on NAACP versus Alabama, and two other McCarthy era cases. All of which address a narrow issue that is just not present here, whether to enforce a subpoena seeking membership lists for the purpose of revealing the identity of suspected communists or other alleged subversive actors.

In that unique situation, certain courts have

struck down subpoenas before requiring production of documents. But they've done so where the identifying information sought was (a) not relevant to the investigation; and (b) the disclosure would itself have a chilling effect and thus infringe on associational privacy under the First Amendment.

Those are the facts in <u>NAACP</u>, in <u>Gibson</u> and also in <u>Sweezy</u> the main cases that Smith & Wesson relies on. The remaining cases have similar privacy issues at stake. And importantly, these are the only cases cited by Smith & Wesson where a Court actually quashes a subpoena before requiring document production based on Constitutional objections.

But the State subpoens here just doesn't seek that type of information. It doesn't seek membership lists or private or sensitive information from individuals so it can't threaten infringement of Smith & Wesson's privacy interest at all. Smith & Wesson certainly can't assert those types of interests in its advertising which is already public, or in you know studies or analyses relating to claims made in its advertising.

One final note on this before I move to the third point on stay, Your Honor, Smith & Wesson has raised additional objections in its opening brief,

including under the Second Amendment and the due process and equal protection clauses, but it abandoned those and did not address it in their reply brief, and made no rebuttal of the arguments in the State's opposition brief. So we would simply stand on those arguments and we respectfully submit that Smith & Wesson can't raise new arguments for the first time at this hearing.

Then for my third point, Your Honor, I will address why a stay is not warranted here. Our opposition brief details why application of the First Filed Rule is not appropriate here. That's because there are important special equities involved. Those include the State's strong interest in protecting consumers from potential ongoing fraud or deceptive advertising, which the legislature made a priority when it enacted the CFA, one of the strongest Consumer Protection Laws in the country.

They also include the State's ability to obtain prompt relief when a party disobeys one of it's (indiscernible). Consumer protection investigations under the CFA would mean very little if the State's subpoenas cannot be effectively enforced.

And the special equities include Smith & Wesson's attempt at jurisdiction shopping here,

especially because their preemptive strike suit in federal court was filed without even an attempt to meet and confer with the State over any objections. And the filing of the suit precluded the State from being the first to file a subpoena enforcement action in this court.

The State is the natural plaintiff here and this Court is the natural forum. In fact, it's designated as such under the CFA at 56:8-6 which requires that any motion to enforce the subpoena has to be filed with the Superior Court. So for these reasons granting a stay would be unjust. And frankly, it would not harm Smith & Wesson at all if this proceeding moves forward.

I'll add one more thing on the stay, Your
Honor, before wrapping up. One of the purposes of the
First Filed Rule is to avoid needless use of judicial
resources. But if this Court were to accept Smith &
Wesson's arguments and to stay the action it would
create a perverse incentive for any party who receives
a subpoena from the State, to follow Smith & Wesson's
lead. Instead of meeting and conferring, and
attempting to resolve disputes, and then only if
necessary moving to quash in this Court, everyone would
race to federal court like Smith & Wesson did here with

a preemptive strike suit to trigger the First Filed Rule. If that were the law it would discourage meet and confer, which frankly, might have avoided this litigation since Smith & Wesson appears to have badly misunderstood what the State's subpoena seeks to investigate. And it would create duplicative litigation and delay any subpoena enforcement until the ultimate resolution of whatever federal action was filed.

Smith and Wesson concedes here that the federal proceeding could take months if not years to resolve, especially since they've withdrawn their request in the federal action for expedited relief. So inflexible application of the First Filed Rule would basically disregard all of these special equities and it would vitiate the Attorney General's ability to properly enforce subpoena.

We recommend to the Court that our Supreme Court's decision in <u>Sensient Colors</u> on this as well as the Massachusetts Supreme Court decision in the <u>Exxon</u> case both of which declined to stay actions in favor of similar preemptive strike suits.

So for those reasons, Your Honor the Division and the Attorney General respectfully the Court denies

Smith & Wesson's motion to stay and motion to quash and

enforce the State's subpoena. I'm happy to answer any questions that you have.

THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Saxena. I have no questions at the moment. But I will reserve my right to ask them on your reply argument. I'll hear now please from counsel for Smith & Weston -- Wesson I'm sorry, Ms. Saleski.

MS. SALESKI: Good morning, again Your Honor.

May it please the Court, from our view this is

procedurally a simple case. This Court should stay the

matter pending the outcome of the First Filed Federal

matter, as it's articulated in cases like the New

Jersey Supreme Court case Sensient.

This subpoena and the related federal action and this enforcement action present important issues regarding among other this First Amendment speech, and in this case disfavored political speech. But Your Honor doesn't need to and shouldn't decide the Constitutional and Federal issues right now. And that is because the proper course here is to stay, which I would like to address first.

But even if the Court decided not to stay, the Court must dismiss the complaint and quash the subpoena because the AG has failed to meet his burden to show that the subpoena is reasonably related to a

legitimate purpose and the subpoena cannot pass

Constitutional scrutiny. I would like to address that second if that's okay with the Court.

Starting the stay, the Court should follow the First Filed Rule here. The proper course under comity principles is not to exercise jurisdiction, but to adhere to the general rule that the Court which first acquires jurisdiction has precedence in the absence of special equities. The AG does not dispute that in briefing or here before the Court that the First Filed Rule requirements are met. Instead the AG tries to demonstrate two compelling special equities that he argues militates against the stay.

But he fails to show that such equities here and thus cannot overcome the First Filed Rule. It's worth noting the circumstances hereto especially because this argument we're hearing about how a meet and confer would've been effective under these circumstances. That is the federal action was filed two months before this one. The AG is actively participating in that action. The AG has offered no reason for the delay in filing this action. There's a tolling agreement in place with respect to the AG's potential CFA claims. And he sought and was granted extensions in both courts.

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There's just no need to proceed today at the speed which the AG requests under these circumstances and we know that from the AG's own conduct. This is the first time that the AG has argued that prompt relief is a special equity. It's not. But under the circumstances if the AG needed prompted relief, he should not have waited two months to file this action. With regards to his special equity arguments that he has in fact raised, first there's forum shopping.

The AG argues that this was forum shopping, but cites absolutely no analogous case to support that accusation. That's because there is no analogous case. Forum shopping generally is when you file an inappropriate forum or one with little to no contacts to avoid a less favorable jurisdiction. An example is the Supreme Court -- the New Jersey Supreme Court case of Heavner which was cited in a case we cited Performance Motor Cars, that's a good example because in that case the plaintiffs filed in New Jersey to try to get the benefit of New Jersey Products Liability Law. But they were North Carolina residents. They bought their car in North Carolina. They had a car accident in North Carolina. And that was all the facts that formed the basis of their actions. They just wanted to get to New Jersey to use New Jersey's

Products Liability Law. That's forum shopping.

Filing in Federal Court in New Jersey, a federal action wasn't forum shopping. It was a filing of a well-founded complaint raising constitutional and federal statutory issues in an appropriate court. For similar reasons this was not a First Strike maneuver. It was an appropriate time supporting by the cases that we cite in our brief like Louisiana Debating and Teleco Communications to bring a pre-enforcement Constitutional Challenge to Federal Court.

No action by the AG was imminent. As we know they didn't file two more months after Smith & Wesson filed. And there was no bad faith here. In fact, the AG doesn't even make a showing, or attempt to make a showing that this was somehow bad faith. As the New Jersey Supreme Court noted in <u>Sensient</u> the first strike maneuver is about bad faith.

The second special equity that the AG tries to establish is a compelling a state interest. But the AG's argument that there is a compelling state interest in rooting out consumer fraud doesn't add to the equities analysis. As the cases he cites and the Courts recognize the special equity requires a showing that the proceeding in another jurisdiction would contravene that policy. The AG doesn't even argue that

the resolution of the federal claims in federal court before proceeding in this court would undermine the policy of consumer protection in New Jersey. And that's because it wouldn't.

Smith & Wesson has entered into a tolling agreement under the AG, such that if the subpoena and the investigation survive federal and constitutional scrutiny no prejudice will result from the delay. The Court's comity inquiry is an inquiry about weighing the interests of the parties and the interests of the judiciary. It would be a waste of resources to have these cases go forward at the same time. And there would be no harm to any interest of the AG in allowing resolution of the federal case to proceed first. Under those circumstances, a stay is appropriate here for comity reasons.

Even if the Court were not to stay, if the Court determined that it was not appropriate under the First Filed Rule, then it's our position that the Court must dismiss the complaint or quash the subpoena.

That's because the AG has not met his burden to show that the subpoena is reasonably related to a legitimate purpose and cannot — that subpoena cannot otherwise survive Constitutional scrutiny.

First, Smith & Wesson has raised multiple

constitutional challenge -- challenges to the subpoena any one of which would invalidate the subpoena.

There's absolutely no merit to the idea that you can compel disclosure without resolving the First Amendment and other claims first.

In the argument for the first time, we hear the AG saying that only McCarthy era cases approach Constitutional issues and subpoena context this way. That's simply not the case. For example, a case cited by the AG which is <u>EEOC versus U PENN</u>, Third Circuit, recognized that it was appropriate to address the First Amendment issues in the subpoena enforcement action. Other cases do the same.

In fact, the Supreme Court has specifically recognized that the power of compulsory process must be carefully circumscribed when the investigative process tends to impinge upon such highly sensitive areas as freedom of speech. That's <u>Sweezy</u>.

The first -- so there are many examples of cases invalidating subpoenas on First Amendment and other Constitutional grounds. Another one that's not from McCarthy era is <a href="Local 1814 International">Local 1814 International</a>
<a href="Local 1804">Longshoremen Association</a> that we cited in our brief.

Similar to that case here, we have the AG's viewpoint discrimination in issuing this subpoena

requires the subpoena to be invalidated. Viewpoint discrimination requires a showing that the government — of the government targeting speech when the specific motivating ideology or the opinion, or perspective of the speaker is the rationale for the restrictions on speech. In other words, the test for viewpoint discrimination is whether the government has singled out a subset of messages for disfavor based on those views expressed.

Smith & Wesson is part if a disfavored industry and is being attacked for engaging in disfavored speech. The Attorney General has singled out those views for disfavor and has now named them fraud. It is a commonsense that we wouldn't even be here if Smith & Wesson was on the other side of the AG's disfavored political speech. And that is resulting in speech that the AG disfavors being chilled.

The AG has allied himself with Anti-Second Amendment Activists. He's hired lawyers to coordinate with those activists. Those are the same groups that have been shopping around as marketing fraud period of AG's is a way to get documents to build cases. There are public reports that have revealed that the goal of these approaches is to obtain documents to use what

they call impact litigation to attack firearms' manufacturers, not to prosecute any fraud.

The AG has told the public that he's turning up the heat on gun manufacturers. The AG has touted a naming and shaming program that unfairly tries to link firearms manufacturers with third party criminal activity. Not only are these public implications of viewpoint discrimination. The viewpoint discrimination is evident in the very subpoena and the arguments made by the AG's briefing.

The Attorney General now seeks to curb Smith & Wesson's speech by labeling it's opinions as fraud in an attempt to chill Smith & Wesson's speech going forward. For example, enhancement of one's lifestyle through firearms ownership is something that AG says he is investigating as potential fraud. A statement like that cannot be fraud. If this were an issue on the other side of the political spectrum, like for example if the AG said he wanted to investigate a women's clinic regarding statements that abortion enhanced one's lifestyle, I don't think we would be here having this debate at all.

This is also so clearly opinion. And in our case, today it's disfavored opinion. And that's why it's so important to scrupulously police viewpoint

discrimination. Right now, it's my client's industry that is disfavored and whose political speech is being targeted. But some day soon it could be another. And this subpoena is viewpoint discrimination based on disfavored speech making it unconstitutional and unenforceable.

In addition, the AG has failed to show the subpoena is reasonably related to a legitimate purpose. It's not enough to just say that he wants to investigate fraud, especially in the context of constitutional issues. Each request seeks documents regarding protected First Amendment opinions about Second Amendment issues that cannot form the basis of fraud. And therefore, the subpoena cannot meet the standard articulated in <u>Greenblatt</u> and the other cases that he's cited and we've cited.

He has suggested that his requests fall into two categories. I will start with his second first, that's how they appeared in the briefing. His second is the one he said was second today, that category was repress regarding whether the company engaged in deceptive advertising regarding products safety benefits and effectiveness. We should all start by recognizing that we aren't talking about a typical product safety issue here. We're talking about

firearms. That makes this case unique. Firearms are a unique product. There is a lot of political discourse around firearms and people have strong beliefs on both sides.

They are also a unique product because they can be dangerous and everyone knows that. But firearms are protected in a Constitutional way. The Second Amendment and the Supreme Court recognized and enshrine a policy that Americans are entitled to bear firearms for their safety and protection. So advertisements that state the same just cannot be fraudulent.

And the AG's subpoena in main asks for documents that regards opinions like that that could never form the basis of fraud actions. For example, the AG talked about whether concealed carry of a firearm enhances one's lifestyle. It's not really clear what that even means. But there's no conceivable way that meets New Jersey's requirement that statements constitute fraud must be a misrepresentation of fact not an opinion on your puffery.

Then there's other things like whether something is safer, like confronting a threat he wants documents related to that. Safer is an opinion in this context and it's certainly situational. It's not a presently existing quantifiable provable fact capable

of exact knowledge at the time made. That language comes from the Cigna case. And that's the standard.

Where the request involves safety, selfdefense, protection, in particular self-defense in the
home, like his request in 4D, E, and F in the subpoena,
Supreme Court precedent like <u>Heller</u> and the Second
Amendment itself has usurped that policy decision the
AG wants to make here. He wants to say that people are
less safe or less protected with firearms. But that's
not a decision for him because in <u>Heller</u> the Supreme
Court recognized that citizen has a right to carry arms
in defense of his property or person and to use them if
either were assailed with such force, numbers, or
violence as made it necessary for protection or safety
of either.

The Second Amendment speaks to security as the reason for it's existence. So statements speaking to a Constitutionally enshrined policy decision and rights cannot constitute fraud. Heller recognized the enshrinement of Constitutional Rights necessarily takes certain policy choices off the table.

These things really cannot be proven false.

That's why the cases cited by the AG to support his inquiry do not provide any support. As we mentioned in our brief, he cites things like Leon versus Rite Aid

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Corp to say that he's allowed to investigate such things. But in that case he was talking about how Rite Aid advertised merchandise at prices and said that they were the lowest prices. That's quantifiable, that's provable. That's not opinion. Those types of cases add nothing here for the Court's analysis and are just not the same.

The second category, which today the AG addresses the first, is the failure to disclose products marketed are unlawful to possess without a permit. This is the only specific allegation that the AG has relied on to try to justify the subpoena. hazardous product regulation which the AG contends requires advertisers to inform New Jersey Consumers of the need for a permit, seems to only have ever been applied in two cases as far as I can tell or been able to tell before today. One in a recent settlement by the AG's office relating to illegal firearms called Ghost Guns and the other in this case. I am not sure if it's in the next case that the AG just mentioned, but that case also involved illegal firearms that could not be legally sold here in New Jersey.

But we know from the briefing here that the AG's theory is that if Smith & Wesson's advertisements available to New Jersey residents did not include a

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Jersey then the AG thinks this is fraud. And we should note despite that the regulation potentially could be applicable to every other industry that somehow requires permits and licensing, like driving cars, or selling liquor, et cetera, there's no other example of the AG using that regulation.

In fact, driving a car requires a license in New Jersey. And if you drive without a license that is a criminal offense, so this would fit right into that statute. But the AG is not targeting any auto maker whose ads are all clearly available to New Jersey residents but don't include that fact. We know why. It's because the more -- this is more evidence of viewpoint discrimination and it's because the AG wants to turn up the heat on gun manufacturers. But it is also evidence of how the AG has not and cannot articulate a legitimate purpose for the subpoena and investigation because it's not targeting fraud and false statements. It's targeting opinions expressed in national advertisements of a disfavored industry with which he disagrees.

We've described also in detail in our briefing why this regulation cannot be constitutionally abide to Smith & Wesson because it unconstitutionally

compels speech. So even were the Court to apply the most lenient standard in evaluating this, that's the <a href="Central Hudson">Central Hudson</a> case, it would still have to evaluate whether the notice requirement was narrowly drawn and not more extensive than necessary to serve New Jersey interests. But it's not. There is a really simple way the State could do this. It could modify it's online permit form for all firearms that includes even BB-guns, you have to get a permit form to include a statement regarding concealed carry. Under such circumstances New Jersey cannot force Smith & Wesson to carry the State's message and it cannot survive Constitutional scrutiny.

Imagine the implications on both inter-state commerce and speech if the AG's theory were permitted. Every advertisement or promotional statement made by Smith & Wesson, whether by a magazine advertisement, broadcast commercial, tweet, or any other form of advertisement that has the potential to reach the State of New Jersey, which is to say every advertisement would have to have New Jersey's legal disclaimers along with any other applicable State laws. This certainly creates dormant commerce clause issues as we have raised in the federal case and our motion to quash. It

would be just entirely too burdensome to meet the purposes. And I will just note that we obviously have not made any of those issues. They're all incorporated into our briefing.

This subpoens is a political attack on disfavored speech. This is not about protecting consumers. Even an unbiased journalist recognized that in that New York Times article we cited for Your Honor, calling the AG's arguments disingenuous and the subpoens a Trojan horse. This is about digging and fishing to try to find something to use and it's about chilling his favored political speech.

In the first instance, it's our request that Your Honor stay in comity to the First Filed action.

But if the Court determines not to stay, because the AG has not met his burden to show his subpoena has a legitimate purpose and because the subpoena cannot pass constitutional scrutiny, then it must dismiss and quash. Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you.

MR. SAXENA: Your Honor, I'm happy to respond if that's appropriate now.

THE COURT: Yes, I'm just reviewing my notes
Mr. Saxena. One moment.

(Pause in hearing)

THE COURT: I will hear you Mr. Saxena. At the outset I would like to hear you on the argument of Smith & Wesson that there is not basis for your subpoena under the Consumer Fraud Act that the two areas that have been asserted, or two areas of concern that there are statements made by Smith & Wesson that may have an impact on personal safety and/or safety at home, and that certain ads depict and market the concealed carry of firearms while omitting the material fact that in New Jersey concealed carry of firearms requires a permit.

So first I'll hear you on whether or not those are the assertions upon which you're attaching your subpoena, or the basis of the subpoena. And then I'll hear you on her argument that those do not properly support your subpoena.

MR. SAXENA: Sure, Your Honor. So those -those are the two broad you know bases that are
outlined in our papers. And those are the two bases
that we are relying on, if I'm understanding correctly.

I can go through each of them and explain why each provides a basis for the State to at least investigate under the Consumer Fraud Act.

THE COURT: I'll hear you on each of them and then, Mr. Saxena, whatever else you want to add in

response to Ms. Saleski's argument.

MR. SAXENA: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: You're welcome.

MR. SAXENA: So just as a preliminary, as I mentioned the Consumer Fraud Act is one of the most protective consumer protection laws in the nation. And the legislature enacted it as such, and instructed that it should be construed probably as a remedial statute. As part of effectuating that policy and protecting the consumers, the statute doesn't just punish fraud, it punishes or makes unlawful unconscionable commercial practices of a wide variety of conduct, and really seeks to establish a standard of kind of good faith and fair dealing in the market.

As another part of ensuring that there's robust enforcement of the statute, the CFA sets up a very broad authority for the Attorney General to actually issue subpoenas for potential violations under the act. Under 56:8-3 the act says, "when it shall appear to the Attorney General that a person has engaged in, is engaging in, or is about to engage in any practice declared to be unlawful by the act, or when it believes it to be in the public interest that an investigation should be made to ascertain that, then he may examine documents and use subpoenas to

effectuate that purpose.

So the authority is quite broad. So the question then is what is the potential violation that could be an issue. As to -- I'll start with the claim about safety, benefits and effectiveness. Again we're at the subpoena enforcement stage so we're not in a position to weigh out all of the elements of a claim for Your Honor, nor would that be appropriate to disclose all of our investigative thinking and work product to --

THE COURT: I'm not asking you to do that Mr. Saxena. I just simply want to hear what the anchor is for the subpoena. Certainly, there's got be some --

MR. SAXENA: Sure.

THE COURT: -- understanding by the AG of some possible fraud that this broad subpoena power is utilized for. So that's what I want to hear.

MR. SAXENA: I -- I think it will help to give you an illustrative example, Your Honor. That is I would just say a hypothetical that is grounded in reality right here. You know, if let's say Smith & Wesson marketed a firearm that -- and it said in an advertisement that the firearm has a "self-defense trigger". And that trigger made that firearm especially effective for purposes of self-defense, and

indeed more effective than the competition's firearms. But in fact, you know the actual data in Smith & Wesson's possession indicated that the so-called self-defense trigger did not actually improve the odds of successful use in self-defense and did not render it a superior product when compared to competitor's products. That would be a violation of the CFA. It would be deceptive advertising.

Were that to be the case and should we discover those facts that would be an all fours with the <u>Radell</u> case about the football helmets that said that they had new concussion preventative technology when in fact they did not. That was a misleading statement and an advertisement.

So that's an example of a variety of statements about products and about the uses of products that Smith & Wesson may be making in it's advertisements, that are misleading as to the safety, effectiveness, or benefits of the products. Those would be statutory violation under the CFA, which prohibits deceptive advertising, and generally misleading statements.

THE COURT: But that's not the case here -MR. SAXENA: As to the regulation --

THE COURT: We don't have something like that

here, do we?

MR. SAXENA: Well we do, Your Honor, again without you know, without disclosing our thinking at this stage, we are concerned about statements that Smith & Wesson has made about it's products and their efficacy as compared to other products and their efficacy for purposes of use for self-defense, and for other purposes. This is not a -- as opposing counsel describes, this is not a general inquiry into the appropriateness of firearms for use in self-defense.

We obviously understand that firearms have Constitutionally recognized uses for purposes of self-defense. It's an inquiry into the specific statements made by Smith & Wesson in it's advertising about the specific products that it is advertising.

THE COURT: So what specific statements and what specific products?

MR. SAXENA: So again, that is what -- again our view is it's not appropriate to disclose here, because (a) it's our investigative thinking and our strategy, and (b) we don't have all of the arguments yet, Your Honor. So I've given you an example that is grounded in reality. Smith & Wesson did in fact market a firearm with a self-defense trigger. That has been the subject of prior litigation.

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But our concerns are also broader than that.

And the Attorney General at this stage of the proceeding under the broad authority under the Consumer Fraud Act is entitled to look into these matters.

Separately, as to the regulatory violation, you know, it is correct that we did identify one advertisement in our papers. Again, as an illustrative example the bodyguard advertisement which marketed a product, a firearm for purposes of concealed carry. And you know, encouraged consumers, including New Jersey Consumers to purchase the product and use it for concealed carry saying that it was particularly effective concealed carry. And you know, in that instance, again we have concerns that there might be a violation of the regulation. We haven't conclusively determined that yet, nor have we conclusively determined that there's a statutory violation. But at the very least, we're entitled to investigate it in that the advertisement makes no disclosures about you know, the fact that it is unlawful to -- not possess a firearm, but conceal carry a firearm in New Jersey without a permit that is difficult to obtain.

Consumers are entitled to this information to get full transparency into what they're buying. And so yes, that -- you know, that is something that we're

investigating. Again, we do not have access to the full compliment of Smith & Wesson's advertising. Some of it is public. Some of it is around, but certainly not all of it. And so we're entitled to review it to kind of address these concerns, especially under the broad authority that the CFA provides.

And that also, by the way Your Honor, explains some of the requests that Ms. Saleski has pointed out. Do you have a copy of the subpoena in front of you, Your Honor?

THE COURT: I have the verified complaint.

Does that have the language in it? Let me see.

MR. SAXENA: It's also exhibit B to the Vandyke certification that was submitted along with the verified complaint. I'm not sure if you have that.

THE COURT: I have it in the electronic file which I've got to pull up. If you want to read language to me, you can do that.

MR. SAXENA: Yeah, I can start us off. I was just going to address the concern about some of these requests don't have -- don't go to deceptive advertising, or don't go to a potential CFA violation.

I just wanted to walk through some of the key requests.

And you know, honestly, I would've preferred to do this at a meet and confer with counsel for Smith & Wesson.

This is the type of thing that we would've done. But I think it's useful if we do it here.

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. SAXENA: The first request, seeks true, accurate, and complete copies of all advertisements for your merchandise, here firearms, that are or were available or accessible in New Jersey concerning and then a variety of topics are listed there, including you know, the benefits of Smith & Wesson firearm.

Again that advertisement -- that request seeks the advertisements, right, so we can assess the factual claims that are made by Smith & Wesson about the advertisements.

The second request is similar, in that it requests drafts of the advertisements. The reason being if there was language or particular representations that were omitted in early drafts because of concerns that they might be misleading, they may be revealing as to whether Smith & Wesson has made a knowing omission in violation of the CFA.

The third request is one that I discussed already concerning tests, studies, and analyses that bear on the factual claims made in the advertisements that are at issue, if those studies illustrate things that are contrary to the representations that are made

in the advertising, then that could be evidence that the advertisements are misleading.

Request four is the one that Smith & Wesson really focuses on and particularly 4B, out of all the other requests I think they really had an issue with this one. Again, we could've clarified this in discussions with them. But this request was an attempt to seek documents concerning topics that are related to claims that are made in the advertising or types of advertising that we're concerned about.

So 4A whether Smith & Wesson firearms can be legally concealed and carried, that goes straight to the regulatory violation, right. We want to understand both the advertisements and also what Smith & Wesson's thinking was if any on making representations as to whether these firearms can be legally concealed or carried by New Jersey consumers.

4B is the lifestyle request and I grant that it may be difficult to parse this one if you're not familiar with the types of advertisements here. But Smith & Wesson certainly is and they should know that firearms are increasingly being marketed as lifestyle accessories. Accessories that are not only, you know, suitable for you know, extreme situations like home defense, in the case of an invader, but something that

you can carry with you in a purse to Yoga class, or to work, or to you know, a bar, you know which is conduct that is illustrated in advertisements for firearms, because they're being marketed as a lifestyle accessory. So marketing firearms as a lifestyle accessory is directly related to the regulatory violation because it goes to the concealed carry of firearms, which is set forth in this request. Granted it could've been clearer.

The rest of the requests in four are similarly, you know, Smith & Wesson is treating them like allegations in a complaint. It's treating them like we are alleging that you know, Smith & Wesson's advertisements assert that a firearm makes the home safer and that somehow is a violation of the CFA. But that's not the intent here. These are topics in a subpoena and we seek to discovery, you know, discoverable information about specific advertisements and specific firearms making specific claims about whether those products will make the consumer safer in specific circumstances.

Again, we don't know what those circumstances exactly are yet, because we're at this early stage in the proceeding. But that's where those requests are intended to go. You know, I'll just do requests five

and six and wrap this up, because a lot of the other requests are kind of jurisdictional in nature, trying to get a better understanding of the extent to which Smith & Wesson is directing it's marketing into New Jersey and marketing products in New Jersey. We certainly know that they do it. But obviously, we would want to get a better understanding of to what extent.

Request five, you know, concerns Smith & Wesson's policies about ensuring compliance with New Jersey laws. That goes directly to the regulatory violation, because we just would like to understand as a background fact whether Smith & Wesson has ever considered this issue of complying with the regulation. And request six, goes similarly like request three, to basically documents in Smith & Wesson's possession like risk assessments that might belie the claims that are made, the factual claims that are made, you know, in its advertising.

So I wanted to start there because I thought that might be helpful in terms of bridging the gap between how the parties are characterizing the subpoena. That at lest is our view and our intent behind those requests.

I'll say as to, you know, a couple of more

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points and then I will wrap up, Your Honor, we're not saying, you know as -- the important question about timing, you know, is this an appropriate time to consider the Constitutional objections? We're not saying that only McCarthy era cases considered that issue. Smith & Wesson did cite more recent cases involving anonymous individuals on the internet who wished to stay anonymous but a subpoena or other demands sought to identify them and make public their identifying information. But that clearly implicates the same type of associational privacy interest that is addressed in the McCarthy era cases. And it's just not present here. And Local 1814 which Ms. Saleski mentioned, is just directly in the lineage of McCarthy era cases. Although it's more recent, it involved a membership list request for union members that had -that wasn't relevant to the overall investigation and had the risk of chilling conduct.

You know, as to the second amendment, you know Ms. Saleski asserted that the <u>DC versus Heller</u> case somehow kind of makes the -- takes the inquiry here under the CFA off the table. That's just simply not the case. I mean <u>Heller</u> did not involve deceptive advertising. It didn't discuss deceptive advertising. In fact the decision expressly acknowledged that

reasonable regulation of the commercial sale of firearms is constitutional and does not offend the Second Amendment. So <u>Heller</u> is just off point here. The policy choice, by the way that they were talking about taking off the table in that decision, was a complete and total ban on the possession of handguns in the District of Columbia. That clearly is not what we're dealing with here.

On the stay, Your Honor, I would just note ——
I guess both parties have urged Your Honor to read

Sensient Colors if you haven't already, but I would
just say read the decision. The Court declines to stay
the case there. It cited the Third Circuit case Moses

H. Cone which similarly declined a stay because of a
preemptive first strike suit.

You know, counsel makes that argument that is not forum shopping because there is not an issue of a different geographic forum. But you know, our argument is not that they're trying to take it into a different geographic forum, clearly, they're still in the district of New Jersey. It's just that there are now two parallel proceedings and there's this tricky issue about which is going to go. And the federal proceeding, because they have delays, their request for expedited relief is now going to take months if not

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years. So it is forum shopping to the extent that they will not have to deal with enforcement of the subpoena, for, you know, extended period of time. Whereas if this Court makes a decision, you know the subpoena might be enforced much sooner.

The tolling agreement that they mentioned and the two month delay, so I got to say that argument takes a certain amount of chutzpah because you know, the ordinary course here is that we issue a subpoena and a party comes to us to meet and confer, and at least discuss the objections to the subpoena. But again, here, you know the day after telling us that they are going to refuse to comply with the subpoena in it's entirety, Smith & Wesson went to federal court and commenced litigation. So after that point there really wasn't much to meet and confer about. They kind of missed that opportunity and made clear where they were -- you know, where they were going with this. We had to deal with their requests in the federal forum for emergent relief and understand how it was going to impact this case. So it did take us some time to do that and then get around to actually filing this motion to enforce. But that's not the relevant time period. We didn't sit on our rights. We had one day -- they gave us one day to file a motion to enforce in this

Court before they filed in federal court. That's the relevant time period here.

So again, I think because of that reason, a stay would be particularly unjust. They say that no prejudice would arise from the delay because there's a tolling agreement. Now while we may ultimately be able to bring claims down the road, let's say months or years because of the tolling agreement, any ongoing violations of law will continue to occur during that time. Of course, we don't know that those are happening, but the subpoena was issued because there's a suspicion that those were happening.

Jersey consumers. They also complain of a waste of resources, but they can't really be heard to complaint of that, Your Honor, because they are the ones that filed, you know, their Constitutional claims as a complaint in federal court, rather than moving to quash in this Court, which they could've done without the federal complaint. And then there would be no duplicative litigation. So I think that's all I would like to respond now unless you have any other questions.

THE COURT: No, thank you Mr. Saxena. Ms. Saleski, is there anything you want to add before we

disconnect?

MS. SALESKI: Yes, Judge just a few things, thank you. So first on this day, on the timing that argument just doesn't make any sense in light of the time line in the federal action. So we filed on December 15th. The AG asked for an extension of time for 14 days to answer the complaint. Then the parties jointly submitted a briefing schedule on January 21st. Nothing happens in the federal court then until the AG files it's motion to dismiss on February 22nd.

In the meantime, on February 12th, that's when the AG files it's state court action. There was actually no emergent or preliminary injunction or TRO request at that time because it wasn't clear that we were -- we needed expedited relief. Then when the AG filed in this Court, we were afraid for our client's rights that they wouldn't get resolved, and that's when the emergent relief was requested.

It's correct. It was withdrawn because after that we negotiated a briefing schedule that made sense and made clear that nothing was going to happen in the immediate days that followed. So it's just really not correct, or fair, or genuine to say that somehow that timing there was what capped the filing. Two months was two months and we have to live with those facts.

Forum shopping, it's not forum shopping. It's just not. I mean the thing that we just heard described as forum shopping was that it may take months or years for a decision so that's forum shopping. That's not correct. It's just not forum shopping.

And also I'll note there's this decision right now pending before the District Court, the briefing is almost finish. The AG just asked for another extension in the District Court to file it's reply. But this is a motion to dismiss and it has a Younger argument to it. We think we have the better of the arguments, because we always do. But we do think we have the better of the arguments, but if the Judge were to grant the relief requested by the AG under Younger grounds that case is over.

So it's really -- that we'll know in short order once the AG gets the reply in and it will be fully briefed and I think the Court has said no oral argument on that.

This meet and confer issue, you know, going through that subpoena, it strikes me as -- we're talking about opinion issues, and then we're talking about sort of subsets of opinion issues. If we want all of your advertisements that relate to home safety. You know our position on that. That's political speech

that is protected and can never be fraud.

So to ask for sort of the subset of that then, which is like your drafts of those because we want to know what you were thinking, also violates the Constitution. And under these circumstances where it's clear that the AG is politically aligned, and we were looking -- our client was looking at these document requests and I don't know -- I don't know what this idea is that this one -- that I'm going to come back to in a second is rooted in reality because the AG has not pointed that out to us.

But we were looking at these requests and saying what are these, because they did not appear to be rooted in reality for us. That's when we discovered that there's marketing fraud theory, that academics, and people who were opposed to Second Amendment protections have been shopping around to AG's.

So if we take the lifestyle one, the idea that they want to get a sense of why we're thinking that somebody should put a gun in their purse when there's this permitting law that we say can't Constitutionally be applied to us just doesn't ring true from our end of it. And I think that the permitting law would not sort of ask the question, why would somebody put that in their purse?

You know, it seems more in line with the idea that there was this subpoena that was crafted to get at this political discourse and it's all based in that. So one example that I don't understand how it's rooted in reality, but we can put that away, the one example that the AG gave is self-defense trigger and more effective than others. There's only one request in this whole page that you went through with the AAG that would go to that, and that's 4E. So like 95% of the subpoena does not relate to that. And it's not a concrete this idea that it's rooted in reality, but I'm not going to tell you where. That's not an anchor. And that's what — that doesn't respond to what the Court was asking for.

The repeated statements that somehow the AG has broad authority, that's really not enough. That's not enough under the law. It's not enough in cases like <u>Gibson</u>. <u>Gibson</u> is a supreme court case that recognized that the Constitutionality is not coexpensive with the authority granted by legislation and that makes sense because it's not just about whether you're authorized. It doesn't compel the conclusion that you're free to inquire into any and all demands.

So we would ask the Court again to stay. We would ask the Court if you're not going to stay to

please consider our request that this complaint be dismissed or that the subpoena be quashed. THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. Thank you both for your very thorough arguments and briefs. I will be considering your arguments. And I will issue an opinion either in writing or else, if I am going to read it into the record, I will notify you 24 hours at least in advance. So thank you both. And good luck. MS. SALESKI: Thank you for your time, Your Honor. THE COURT: You're welcome. MR. SAXENA: Thank you, Your Honor. THE COURT: You're welcome. (Hearing concluded at 11:22 a.m.) 

AD/T 625

AOC Number

## CERTIFICATION

I, Sharon Conover, the assigned transcriber, do hereby certify the foregoing transcript of proceedings on CourtSmart, Index No. from 10:11:12 to 11:22:43, is prepared to the best of my ability and in full compliance with the current Transcript Format for Judicial Proceedings and is a true and accurate non-compressed transcript of the proceedings, as recorded.

/s/ Sharon Conover
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